…officious lies, as well as all others, are an abomination to the God of Truth. –John Wesley
This morning, Gentle Reader, we will briefly explore ‘Lying’ from the perspective of the deceived.
Most of us humans who learn that they have been lied to when it comes to something they deem important experience the pain of betrayal and become resentful, disappointed and suspicious; trust is bent, broken or shattered. They also look back on past interactions with a questioning attidue.
The manipulation of the lie, they come to see, kept them from making informed choices; they were, in effect, unable to choose actions that they would have chosen had they not been lied to.
It is true, Gentle Reader, that personal, informed choice is not the only kind available to them. They may decide to abandon choosing for themselves and let the other(s) decide for them – think: guardians, advisors or elected officials. They may even decide to abandon choice based upon information of a conventional nature and trust/rely instead on the movement of the stars or by throwing dice against a wall or to seek out soothsayers or oracles (of course, these last two folks never provide us with direct answers and as a result a great deal of bother has occurred – both history and great literature reminds us, over and over again).
One’s alternatives ought to be personally chosen and not surreptitiously imposed by lies or other forms of manipulation. I still believe that most of us humans would resist loss of control over which choices we want to delegate to others and this requires that we are aided by the best information available to us (think of the power of ‘fake news’ and its impact upon our freedom to choose).
Experience has taught us, continues to teach us, the consequences when others choose to deceive us – even for ‘our own good.’
What about the ‘trivial lies’? Well, we know that many lies are trivial AND we also know that we have no way to judge, in the moment, which lies are trivial and which are not. Add to this that we have no confidence that liars will restrict themselves to telling trivial lies, we, over time, become wary of all deception or worse, we assume deception will occur (think: How many of us trust the words of the politician seeking our vote).
Now I can hear someone saying: But only one person was lied to. Consider that though only one person was lied to that many others might well be harmed as a result. Recently an elected official – a Mayor – was lied to about the quality of the drinking water and as a result many people suffered when they drank contaminated water.
The perspective of the deceived is shared by all of those who experience the consequences of the lie – whether or not they have been lied to.
We need both knowledge and freedom to choose and to act if we are going to be able to make informed decisions. Paradoxically, or is it ironically, the liar would agree with this (ask any politician and he or she would agree with this). Deception – lying – denies the one being deceived of both: knowledge and freedom to choose.
Deception can be – often is – coercive. When it succeeds the deceiver becomes more powerful. Thus, it is clearly unreasonable to assert that people should be able to lie with impunity whenever they want to do so. To up the ante, it would be unreasonable, as well, to assert such a right even in the more restricted circumstances where the liars claim a ‘good reason’ for lying.
This is especially true because lying so often accompanies every ‘other’ form of wrongdoing, from murder to bribery to tax fraud to theft of all kinds.
In refusing to condone such a right to decide when to lie and when not to, we are therefore trying to protect ourselves against lies which help to execute or cover up all other wrongful acts.
For this reason, the perspective of the deceived supports the statement by Aristotle: Falsehood is in itself mean and culpable, and truth noble and full of praise.
Consider this, Gentle Reader, that there is an initial imbalance in the evaluation of truth-telling and lying. Lying requires a ‘reason,’ while truth-telling does not. ‘Lying’ must be excused; reasons must be produced, in any one case, to show why a particular lie is not ‘mean and culpable.’
This leads us to the question: What about the perspective of the Liar?